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The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, and in Vietnam as the American War, occurred from 1959 to April 30, 1975. The term Vietnam Conflict is often used to refer to events which took place between 1959 and April 30, 1975. The war was fought between the Communist-supported Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States supported Republic of Vietnam. It concluded with the withdrawl of American troops and failure of the United States foreign policy in Vietnam.The landmark series Vietnam: A Television History, first broadcast in 1983, is a special presentation of the award-winning PBS history series, American Experience.Vietnam War. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved on 2008-03-05. “Meanwhile, the United States, its military demoralized and its civilian electorate deeply divided, began a process of coming to terms with the longest and most controversial war”
Over 1.4 million military personnel were killed in the war (only 6% were members of the United States armed forces), while estimates of civilian fatalities range from 2 to 5.1 million. On April 30, 1975, the capital of South Vietnam, Saigon fell to the communist forces of North Vietnam, effectively ending the Vietnam War.
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Various names have been applied to the conflict, and these have shifted over time, although Vietnam War is the most commonly used title in English. It has been variously called the Second Indochina War, the Vietnam Conflict, the Vietnam War, and, in Vietnamese, Chiến tranh Việt Nam (The Vietnam War), Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (Resistance War against America) or The American War.
In 1950, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and China recognized each other diplomatically. The Soviet Union quickly followed suit. U.S. President Harry S. Truman countered by recognizing the French puppet government of Vietnam. Washington feared that Hanoi was a pawn of Communist China and, by extension, Moscow. This flew in the face of the long historical antipathy between the two nations, of which the U.S. seems to have been completely ignorant.McNamara, Argument Without End pp 377-79 As Doan Huynh commented, “Vietnam a part of the Chinese expansionist game in Asia? For anyone who knows the history of Indochina, this is incomprehensible.” Nevertheless, Chinese support was very important to the Viet Minh\'s success, and China largely supported the Vietnamese Communists through the end of the war.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 marked a decisive turning point. From the perspective of many in Washington, D.C., what had been a colonial war in Indochina was transformed into another example of communist expansionism directed by the Kremlin.Pentagon Papers, Gravel, ed, Chapter 2, \'U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War\', p. 54.
In 1950, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) arrived to screen French requests for aid, advise on strategy and train Vietnamese soldiers.Herring, George C.: “America\'s Longest War”, p. 18. By 1954, the U.S. had supplied 300,000 small arms and spent one billion dollars in support of the French military effort. The Eisenhower administration was shouldering 80% of the cost of the war.Zinn, “A People\'s History of the United States”, p. 471. The Viet Minh received crucial support from the Soviet Union and the People\'s Republic of China. Chinese support in the Border Campaign of 1950 allowed supplies to come from China into Vietnam. Throughout the conflict, U.S. intelligence estimates remained skeptical of French chances of success.The Pentagon Papers. Gravel, ed. vol. 1, pp 391–404.
The Battle of Dien Bien Phu marked the end of French involvement in Indochina. The Viet Minh and their mercurial commander Vo Nguyen Giap handed the French a stunning military defeat. On May 7, 1954, the French Union garrison surrendered. At the Geneva Conference the French negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the Viet Minh. Independence was granted to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. As a U.S. Army study noted, France lost the war primarily because it “neglected to cultivate the loyalty and support of the Vietnamese people.” More than 400,000 civilians and soldiers had died during the nine year conflict.
Vietnam was temporarily partitioned at the 17th parallel, and under the terms of the Geneva Convention, civilians were to be given the opportunity to freely move between the two provisional states. Nearly one million northerners (mainly Catholics) fled south in “understandable terror” of Ho Chi Minh\'s new regime.1 PENTAGON PAPERS (The Senator Gravel Edition), 248 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971) It is estimated that as many as two million more would have left had they not been stopped by the Viet Minh.Robert Turner, VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT, 102 (Stanford Ca: Hoover Institution Press, 1975) In the north, the Viet Minh established a socialist state—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—and engaged in a land reform program in which the mass killing of perceived “class enemies” occurred. Ho Chi Minh later apologized. In the south a non-communist state was established under the Emperor Bao Dai, a former puppet of the French and the Japanese. Ngo Dinh Diem became his Prime Minister. In addition to the Catholics flowing south, up to 90,000 Viet Minh fighters went north for “regroupment” as envisioned by the Geneva Accords. However, in contravention of the Accords, the Viet Minh left roughly 5,000-10,000 cadres in South Vietnam as a “politico-military substructure within the object of its irredentism.”1 PENTAGON PAPERS (The Senator Gravel Edition), 247, 328 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971)
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles greet President Ngo Dinh Diem in Washington.
As dictated by the Geneva Conference of 1954, the partition of Vietnam was meant to be only temporary, pending national elections on July 20, 1956. Much like Korea, the agreement stipulated that the two military zones were to be separated by a temporary demarcation line (known as the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ). The United States, alone among the great powers, refused to sign the Geneva agreement.McNamara Argument Without End p. 60. The President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, declined to hold elections. This called into question the United States\' commitment to democracy in the region, but also raised questions about the legitimacy of any election held in the communist-run North. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed U.S. fears when he wrote that, in 1954, “80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh” over Emperor Bao Dai.Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change. Garden City, NJ. Doubleday & Company, 1963, p. 372.Pentagon Papers However, this wide popularity was expressed before Ho\'s disastrous land reform program and a peasant revolt in Ho\'s home province which had to be bloodily suppressed.
The cornerstone of U.S. policy was the Domino Theory. This argued that if South Vietnam fell to communist forces, then all of South East Asia would follow. Popularized by the Eisenhower Administration,McNamara Argument Without End p. 19. some argued that if communism spread unchecked, it would follow them home by first reaching Hawaii and follow to the West Coast of the United States. It was better, therefore, to fight communism in Asia, rather than on American soil. Thus, the Domino Theory provided a powerful motive for the American creation of a client state in southern Vietnam.John F. Kennedy. “America\'s Stakes in Vietnam.” Speech to the American Friends of Vietnam, June, 1956. The theory underpinned American policy in Vietnam for five presidencies. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Another important motive was the preservation of U.S. credibility and prestige.
The United States pursued a policy of containment. Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization model, Washington established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to counter communist expansion in the region. The policy of containment was first suggested by George F. Kennan in the 1947 X Article, published anonymously in Foreign Affairs and remained U.S. policy for the next quarter of a century.
Ngo Dinh Diem was chosen by the U.S. to lead South Vietnam. A devout Roman Catholic, he was fervently anti-communist and was “untainted” by any connection to the French. He was one of the few prominent Vietnamese nationalist who could claim both attributes. Historian Luu Doan Huynh notes, however, that “Diem represented narrow and extremist nationalism coupled with autocracy and nepotism.”McNamara Argument Without End p. 200–201.
The new American patrons were almost completely ignorant of Vietnamese culture. They knew little of the language or long history of the country. There was a tendency to assign American motives to Vietnamese actions, and Diem warned that it was an illusion to believe that blindly copying Western methods would solve Vietnamese problems.
In April and June 1955, Diem (against U.S. advice) cleared the decks of any political opposition by launching military operations against the Cao Dai religious sect, the Buddhist Hoa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen organized crime group (which was allied with members of the secret police and some military elements). Diem accused these groups of harboring Communist agents. As broad-based opposition to his harsh tactics mounted, Diem increasingly sought to blame the communists.Robert K. Brigham Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History
Beginning in the summer of 1955, he launched the “Denounce the Communists” campaign, during which communists and other anti-government elements were arrested, imprisoned, tortured or executed. Opponents were labeled Viet Cong by the regime to demean their nationalist credentials. During this period refugees moved across the demarcation line in both directions. Around 52,000 Vietnamese civilians moved from south to north. However a staggering 450,000 people fled north Vietnam to the south, in aircraft and ships provided by France and the U.S.John Prados, \'The Numbers Game: How Many Vietnamese Fled South In 1954?\', The VVA Veteran, January/February 2005; accessed 2007-01-21[6] CIA propaganda efforts increased the outflow with slogans such as “the Virgin Mary is going South.” The northern refugees were meant to give Diem a strong anti-communist constituency.Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 238.
In a referendum on the future of the monarchy, Diem rigged the poll which was supervised by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and received “98.2 percent” of the vote. His American advisers had recommended a more modest winning margin of “60 to 70 percent.” Diem, however, viewed the election as a test of authority.Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 239. On October 26, 1955, Diem declared the new Republic of Vietnam, with himself as president.Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 19. The creation of the Republic of Vietnam was largely because of the Eisenhower administration\'s desire for an anti-communist state in the region. Robert K. Brigham. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History.[7] Colonel Edward Lansdale, a CIA officer, became an important advisor to the new president.
As a wealthy Catholic, Diem was viewed by many ordinary Vietnamese as part of the old elite that had helped the French rule Vietnam. The majority of Vietnamese people were Buddhist, so his attack on the Buddhist community served only to deepen mistrust. Diem\'s human rights abuses increasingly alienated the population.
In May, Diem undertook a ten day state visit of the United States. President Eisenhower pledged his continued support. A parade in New York City was held in his honor. Although Diem was openly praised, in private Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceded that he had been selected because there were no better alternative.;Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 230.
In 1956 one of the leading communists in the south, Le Duan, returned to Hanoi to urge the Vietnam Workers\' Party to take a firmer stand on the reunification of Vietnam under Communist leadership. But Hanoi (then in a severe economic crisis) hesitated in launching a full-scale military struggle. The northern Communists feared U.S. intervention and believed that conditions in South Vietnam were not yet ripe for a people\'s revolution. However, in December 1956, Ho Chi Minh authorized the Viet Minh cadres still in South Vietnam to begin a low level insurgency.James Olson and Randy Roberts, WHERE THE DOMINO FELL: AMERICA AND VIETNAM, 1945-1990, 67 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991) (Ho Chi Minh ordered, "Do not engage in military operations; that will lead to defeat. Do not take land from a peasant. Emphasize nationalism rather than communism. Do not antagonize anyone if you can avoid it. Be selective in your violence. If an assassination is necessary, use a knife, not a rifle or grenade. It is too easy to kill innocent bystanders with guns and bombs, and accidental killing of the innocent bystanders will alienate peasants from the revolution. Once an assassination has taken place, make sure peasants know why the killing occurred.”) In North Vietnamese political theory, the action was a subset of "political struggle" called "armed propaganda,"Vo Nguyen Giap, The Political and Military Line of Our Party, in THE MILITARY ART, 179-80 and consisted mostly in kidnappings and terrorist attacks.
Four hundred government officials were assassinated in 1957 alone, and the violence gradually increased. While the terror was originally aimed at local government officials, it soon broadened to include other symbols of the status quo, such as school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc.PENTAGON PAPERS GRAVEL, 335. One estimate purports that by 1958, 20% of South Vietnam\'s village chiefs had been murdered by the insurgents.PENTAGON PAPERS GRAVEL,337. What was sought was a method of completely destroying government control in South Vietnam\'s rural villages in order to be replaced by an NLF shadow government.See Mark Moyar, The War Against the Viet Cong Shadow Government, in THE REAL LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (John Norton Moore and Robert Turner eds., 2002) 151-67. Finally, in January 1959, under pressure from southern cadres who were being targeted by Diem\'s secret police, the north\'s Central Committee issued a secret resolution authorizing an "armed struggle." This authorized the southern Viet Minh to begin large scale operations against the South Vietnamese military. In response, Diem enacted tough new anti-communist laws. However, North Vietnam supplied troops and supplies in earnest, and the infiltration of men and weapons from the north began along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Observing the increasing unpopularity of the Diem regime, on December 12, 1960, Hanoi authorized the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). The NLF was made up of two distinct groups: nationalists and communists. While there were many non-communist members of the NLF, they were subject to party control and increasingly side-lined as the conflict continued. The principal objective of the NLF was to seize political power through a popular insurrection—military operations were secondary. The NLF emphasized patriotism, honesty and good government, while promising the reunification of Vietnam and an end to American influence.
Successive American administrations, as Robert McNamara and others have noted, over-estimated the control that Hanoi had over the NLF. Diem\'s paranoia, repression, and incompetence progressively angered large segments of the population of South Vietnam.U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, vol. 2, p. 2. Thus, many maintain that the origins of the anti-government violence were homegrown, rather than inspired by Hanoi.U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, vol. 2, pp 28-30. However, as historian Douglas Pike pointed out, “today, no serious historian would defend the thesis that North Vietnam was not involved in the Vietnam war from the start…. To maintain this thesis today, one would be obliged to deal with the assertion of Northern involvement that have poured out of Hanoi since the end of the war."Douglas Pike, The Origins of the War: Competing Perceptions in THE VIETNAM DEBATE: A FRESH LOOK AT THE ARGUMENTS 83-89, 86 (John Norton Moore ed., 1990).
When John F. Kennedy won the 1960 U.S. presidential election, one major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had surpassed those of the U.S. As Kennedy took over, despite warnings from Eisenhower about Laos and Vietnam, Europe and Latin America "loomed larger than Asia on his sights."Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 264 In his inaugural address, Kennedy made the ambitious pledge to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty."The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. [http.//www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/inaug/kennedy.htm Inaugural Address of John F. Kenndy].
In June 1961, John F. Kennedy bitterly disagreed with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev when they met in Vienna over key U.S.-Soviet issues. Cold war strategists concluded Southeast Asia would be one of the testing grounds where Soviet forces would test the USA\'s containment policy - begun during the Truman Administration and solidified by the stalemate resulting from the Korean War.
Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity with the Soviets, he was also interested in using special forces for counter insurgency warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insurgencies. Originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by special forces such as the Green Berets would be effective in a "brush fire" war in Vietnam. He saw British success in using such forces in Malaya as a strategic template.
The Kennedy administration remained essentially committed to the Cold War foreign policy inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, Kennedy faced a three-part crisis - the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movementKarnow, Vietnam, 265 suggested that "Kennedy sidestepped Laos, whose rugged terrain was no battleground for American soldiers." - made Kennedy believe another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy determined to \'draw a line in the sand\' and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam saying, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place" to James Reston of the New York Times (immediately after meeting Khrushchev in Vienna).The case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam Presidential Studies Quarterly [8] [9]
In May 1961, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Saigon and enthusiastically declared Diem the "Winston Churchill of Asia."Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 267. Asked why he had made the comment, Johnson replied, "Diem\'s the only boy we got out there." Johnson assured Diem of more aid, in order to mold a fighting force that could resist the communists.
Kennedy\'s policy towards South Vietnam rested on the assumption that Diem and his forces must ultimately defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the deployment of American combat troops and observed that "to introduce U.S. forces in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact, would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military consequences."U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, vol. 3, pp 1-2.
The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor. Bad leadership, corruption and political interference all played a part in emasculating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose, as the insurgency gathered steam. Hanoi\'s support for the NLF played a significant role. But South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core of the crisis.McNamara Argument Without End p. 369. Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow recommended that U.S. troops be sent to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers. Kennedy rejected the idea but increased military assistance yet again. In April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the "danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did."John Kenneth Galbraith. "Memorandum to President Kennedy from John Kenneth Galbraith on Vietnam, 4 April 1962." The Pentagon Papers. Gravel. ed. Boston, Mass. Beacon Press, 1971, vol. 2. pp 669–671. By mid-1962, the number of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam had risen from 700 to 12,000.
The Strategic Hamlet Program had been initiated in 1961. This joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. The aim was to isolate the population from the insurgents, provide education and health care, and strengthen the government\'s hold over the countryside. The Strategic Hamlets, however, were quickly infiltrated by the guerrillas. The peasants resented being uprooted from their ancestral villages. The government refused to undertake land reform, which left farmers paying high rents to a few wealthy landlords. Corruption dogged the program and intensified opposition. Government officials were targeted for assassination. The Strategic Hamlet Program collapsed two years later.
On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations, including, China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States, signed an agreement promising the neutrality of Laos.International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos[10]
Some policy-makers in Washington began to conclude that Diem was incapable of defeating the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned only with fending off coups. As Robert F. Kennedy noted, "Diem wouldn\'t make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with …" Live interview by John Bartlow Martin. Was Kennedy Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? New York, NY. John F. Kennedy Library, 1964, Tape V, Reel 1. During the summer of 1963 U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of a regime change. The United States Department of State was generally in favor of encouraging a coup. The Pentagon and CIA were more alert to the destabilizing consequences of such an act and wanted to continue applying pressure for reforms.
Chief among the proposed changes was the removal of Diem\'s younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu controlled the secret police and was seen as the man behind the Buddhist repression. As Diem\'s most powerful adviser, Nhu had become a hated figure in South Vietnam. His continued influence was unacceptable to the Kennedy administration. Eventually, the administration concluded that Diem was unwilling to change.
The CIA was in contact with generals planning to remove Diem. They were told that the United States would support such a move. President Diem was overthrown and executed, along with his brother, on November 2, 1963. When he was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered that Kennedy "rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face."Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 326. He had not approved Diem\'s murder. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Ambassador Lodge informed Kennedy that "the prospects now are for a shorter war".Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 327.
Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage of the situation and increased its support for the guerrillas. South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed as a puppet of the Americans. For whatever the failings of Diem, his credentials as a nationalist had been impeccable.McNamara Argument Without End p. 328.
Kennedy increased the number of U.S. military advisers from 800 to 16,300 to cope with rising guerrilla activity. The advisers were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were, however, almost completely ignorant of the political nature of the insurgency. The insurgency was a political power struggle, in which military engagements were not the main goal. The Kennedy administration sought to refocus U.S. efforts on pacification and "winning over the hearts and minds" of the population. The military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisers other than conventional troop training.Douglas Blaufarb. The Counterinsurgency Era. New York, NY. Free Press, 1977, p. 119. General Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963.George C. Herring. America\'s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. Boston, Mass. McGraw Hill, 1986, p. 103 The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort".Foreign Relation of the United States, Vietnam, 1961-1963. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1991, vol. 4., p. 707.
In a conversation with Nobel Peace Prize winner and Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, Kennedy sought his advice. "Get out," Pearson replied. "That\'s a stupid answer," shot back Kennedy. "Everyone knows that. The question is: How do we get out?"quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. New York, NY. Ballantine, 1978, p. 767. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, just three weeks after Diem.
Kennedy had introduced helicopters to the war and created a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese Air Force, staffed with American pilots. He also sent in the Green Berets. He was succeeded by Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, who reaffirmed America\'s support of South Vietnam. By the end of the year Saigon had received $500 million in military aid.
For more details on this topic, see Role of United States in the Vietnam War#Americanization.
A U.S. EB-66 Destroyer and four F-105 Thunderchiefs dropping bombs on North Vietnam.
An alleged NLF activist captured during an attack on an American outpost near the Cambodian border, is interrogated.
Lyndon Johnson, more concerned with his great society and social progressive programs, did not consider Vietnam a priority as he took over the presidency after the death of Kennedy.Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 336 and specifically on 338-339 where presidential aid Jack Valenti recalls, "Vietnam at the time was a could no bigger than a man\'s fist on the horizon. We hardly discussed it because it was not worth discussing." Johnson had a difficult time with American foreign policy makers, specifically Harriman and Acheson, who to Johnson spoke a different language.Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 338 who notes also that Johnson viewed many members whom he inherited from Kennedy\'s cabinet with distrust because he had never penetrated their circle early in Kennedy\'s presidency. Particularly heated was the relationship between the new president and national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when Bundy called LBJ on the phone, LBJ responded:
"Goddammit, Bundy. I\'ve told you that when I want you I\'ll call you."Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 13
On November 24, 1963, Johnson brought a small group together to talk with Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and the new president provided his support to help win the Vietnam war.Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 339 notes Johnson as saying "the battle against communism… must be joined… with strength and determination. We should stop playing cops and robbers [a reference to Diem\'s failed leadership] and get back to... winning the war... tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word...[to] win the contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy." But the pledge came at a time when Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diem.Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 339 notes, talking about the Mekong Delta, that, "At a place called Hoa Phu, for example, the strategic hamlet built during the previous summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane.... Speaking through an interpreter, a local guard explained to me that a handful of Vietcong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear it down and return to their native villages. The peasants complied without question."
The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General Minh--who Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy."Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 340 who quote Minh as enjoying playing tennis more than bureaucratic work. His regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh. Lodge, frustrated by the end of year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?"Quoted from Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 341
On August 2 1964, the USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam\'s coast, started a gunfight with torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin.http://www.nsa.gov/vietnam/releases/relea00012.pdf However, the Maddox claimed that it was attacked.Pentagon Papers A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were murky. Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish."Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 26. The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and gave the president power to conduct military operations in South East Asia without declaring war.
In 2005, however, an NSA declassified reporthttp://www.nsa.gov/vietnam/releases/relea00012.pdf revealed that there was no attack on 4 August. It had already been called into question long before this. "The Gulf of Tonkin incident," writes Louise Gerdes, "is an oft-cited example of the way in which Johnson misled the American people to gain support for his foreign policy in Vietnam."Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 25. George C. Herring argues, however, that McNamara and the Pentagon "did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from the evidence available to them those parts that confirmed what they wanted to believe."George C. Herring, America\'s longest war: the United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 (New York: Wiley, 1979), 121 Rising from 5,000 in 1959, there were now 100,000 guerrilla fighters in 1964. Some have argued that ten soldiers are needed to deal with every one insurgent. Thus, the total number of U.S. troops in 1964 needed to defeat the insurgents may have exceeded the entire strength of the United States Army.
A Marine from 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, moves an alleged NLF activist to the rear during a search and clear operation held by the battalion 15 miles (24 km) west of Da Nang Air Base.
The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On March 2, 1965, following an attack on a U.S. Marine barracks at Pleiku, Operation Flaming Dart and Operation Rolling Thunder commenced. The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF) by threatening to destroy North Vietnam\'s air defenses and industrial infrastructure. As well, it was aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese.Earl L. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991, p. 89. Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 468. Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as Operation Commando Hunt, targeted different parts of the NLF and People\'s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The objective of forcing North Vietnam to stop its support for the NLF, however, was never reached. As one officer noted "this is a political war and it calls for discriminate killing. The best weapon … would be a knife … The worst is an airplane."Lt. Colonel John Paul Vann[11] The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the Communists that "we\'re going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".Gen. Curtis E LeMay
Peasants suspected of being communists under detention of U.S. army, 1966.
Escalation of the Vietnam War officially started on the morning of January 31, 1965 when orders were cut and issued to mobilize the 18th TAC Fighter Squadron from Okinawa to Danang air force base (AFB). A red alert alarm to scramble was sounded at Kadena AFB at 3:00 a.m. F-105\'s, pilots and support were deployed from Okinawa and landed in Vietnam that afternoon to join up with other smaller units who had already arrived weeks earlier. Preparations were under way for the first step of Operation Flaming Dart. The mission of Operation Flaming Dart, to cross the Seventeenth Parallel into North Vietnam, was already planned and in place before the attack on Pleiku. The attack on Pleiku occurred on February 6, 1965. On February 7, 1965 forty nine F-105 Thunderchiefs flew out of Danang AFB to targets located in North Vietnam. From this day forward the war was no longer confined to South Vietnam. It took almost an hour to get all forty nine of the F-105\'s in the air. On that morning, the continuous loud roar of the F-105 engines going down the runway, one following another, was described by the ground crew as a "rolling thunder". At this time the Marines had not landed and Danang AFB was unprotected.
After several attacks, it was decided that U.S. Air Force bases needed more protection. The South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On March 8 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment.Pew Research Center note, (October 2002) Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq Public opinion, however, was based on the premise that Vietnam was part of a global struggle against communism. In a statement similar to that made to the French, almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea." Ho Chi Minh. Letter to Martin Niemoeller. December, 1966. quoted in Marilyn B. Young. The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990. New York, NY. Harper, 1991, p. 172. As former First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co noted, the primary goal of the war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. The policy of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.McNamara, Argument Without End p. 48
The Marines\' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 in March was increased to nearly 200,000 by December.McNamara, Argument Without End pp 349-51 The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission. In May, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Binh Gia. They were again defeated in June, at the Battle of Dong Xoai. Desertion rates were increasing, and morale plummeted. General William Westmoreland informed Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical. He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF [National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam]."U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 4, p. 7 With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America\'s defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open ended.McNamara Argument Without End p. 353 Westmoreland outlined a three point plan to win the war:
U.S. soldiers searching a village for NLF
"Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.
Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would be concluded when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.
Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas."U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 5, pp 8-9.
The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration\'s insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967.U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 4, pp 117–119. and vol. 5, pp 8–12. Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1966, vol. 2, pp 794–799. The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the NLF in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation.McNamara Argument Without End pp 353–354. The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved.
Members of U.S. Navy Seal Team One move down the Bassac River in a Seal team Assault Boat (STAB) during operations along the river south of Saigon, November 1967.
Soon the NLF began to engage in small-unit guerrilla warfare, which allowed them to control the pace of the fighting.The average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old. This compares with twenty-six years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one year tour of duty. The one year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times."John Paul Vann. John Paul Vann: Information from Answers.com. at [12] As a result, training programs were shortened. Some NCO\'s were referred to as "Shake \'N\' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which to get rest and relaxation (R\'n\'R). American troops were vulnerable to attack everywhere they went.
South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. As Stanley Karnow writes, "the main PX, located in the Saigon suburb of Cholon, was only slightly smaller than the New York Bloomingdale\'s …"Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 453. The American build-up transformed the economy and had a profound impact on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption was witnessed. The country was also flooded by civilian specialists from every conceivable field to advise the South Vietnamese government and improve its performance.
Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the PhilippinesKarnow Vietnam: A History p. 566. all agreed to send troops. Major allies, however, notably NATO nations, Canada and the United Kingdom, declined Washington\'s troop requests.Peter Church. ed. A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore, John Wiley & Sons, 2006, p. 193. The U.S. and its allies mounted complex operations, such as operations Masher, Attleboro, Cedar Falls, and Junction City. However, the communist insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility.
Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize somewhat with the coming to power of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1967. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975.Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 706. This ended a long series of military juntas that had begun with Diem\'s assassination. The relative calm allowed the ARVN to collaborate more effectively with its allies and become a better fighting force.
The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor"Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 18. in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories which portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media\'s coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.
In October 1967 a large anti-war demonstration was held on the steps of the Pentagon. Some protesters were heard to chant, "Hey, hey, LBJ (Lyndon Baines Johnson)! How many kids did you kill today?" One reason for the increase in the opposition to the Vietnam War was larger draft quotas.
Having lured General Westmoreland\'s forces into the hinterland at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province,McNamara Argument Without End pp 363-365 in January 1968, the PAVN and NLF broke the truce that had traditionally accompanied the Tet (Lunar New Year) holiday. They launched the surprise Tet Offensive in the hope of sparking a national uprising. Over 100 cities were attacked, including assaults on General Westmoreland\'s headquarters and the U.S. embassy in Saigon.
Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese were initially taken aback by the scale of the urban offensive, they responded quickly and effectively, decimating the ranks of the NLF. In the former capital city of Huế, the NLF captured the Imperial Citadel and much of the city, which led to the Battle of Huế. After the war, North Vietnamese officials acknowledged that the Tet Offensive had, indeed, caused grave damage to NLF forces. But the offensive had another, unintended consequence.
General Westmoreland had become the public face of the war. He was featured on the cover of Time magazine three times and was named 1965\'s Man of the Year."The Guardians at the Gate," Time: The Weekly Newsmagazine January 7, 1966, vol. 87, no.1. Time described him as "the sinewy personification of the American fighting man … (who) directed the historic buildup, drew up the battle plans, and infused the … men under him with his own idealistic view of U.S. aims and responsibilities."
In November 1967 Westmoreland spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support.Witz The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War pp 1–2 In a speech before the National Press Club he said that a point in the war had been reached "where the end comes into view." Larry Berman. Lyndon Johnson\'s War. New York, W.W. Norton, 1991, p. 116. Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland\'s predictions were trumped by Tet. The American media, which had been largely supportive of U.S. efforts, rounded on the Johnson administration, for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Despite its military failure, the Tet Offensive became a political victory and ended the career of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election. Johnson\'s approval rating slumped from 48% to 36%. As James Witz noted, Tet "contradicted the claims of progress … made by the Johnson administration and the military." The Tet Offensive was the turning point in America\'s involvement in the Vietnam War. It had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. The offensive constituted an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor.Karnow Vietnam: A History. p. 556.Harold P. Ford. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers pp 104–123. Journalist Peter Arnett quoted an unnamed officer, saying of Ben Tre that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it" (though the authenticity of this quote is disputed)."Peter Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, April 1, 2003 Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March, just as all resistance was finally subdued. The move was technically a promotion. However, his position had become untenable, because of the offensive and because his request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media. Westmoreland was succeeded by his deputy Creighton Abrams, a commander less inclined to public media pronouncements.
Viet Cong/NVA killed by U.S. air force personnel after an attack on the perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base during the Tet Offensive
On May 10, 1968, despite low expectations, peace talks began between the U.S. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. The Democratic candidate, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, was running against Republican former Vice-President Richard Nixon. Through an intermediary, Nixon advised Saigon to refuse to participate in the talks until after elections, claiming that he would give them a better deal once elected. Thieu obliged, leaving almost no progress made by the time Johnson left office.
As historian Robert Dallek writes, "Lyndon Johnson\'s escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps … cost 30,000 American lives by the time he left office, (and) destroyed Johnson\'s presidency …"Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 27. His refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was Johnson\'s admission that the war was lost. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."McNamara Argument Without End pp 366–367.
For more details on this topic, see The United States and the Vietnam War#Vietnamization, 1969–1974.
Propaganda leaflets urging the defection of NLF and North Vietnamese to the side of the Government of Vietnam.
During the 1968 presidential election, Richard M. Nixon promised "peace with honor". His plan was to build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense of South Vietnam (the Nixon Doctrine). The policy became known as "Vietnamization", a term criticized by Robert K. Brigham for implying that, to that date, only Americans had been dying in the conflict.Robert K. Brigham. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History.[13] Vietnamization had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. One important difference, however, remained. While Kennedy insisted that the South Vietnamese fight the war themselves, he attempted to limit the scope of the conflict. In pursuit of a withdrawal strategy, Richard Nixon was prepared to employ a variety of tactics, including widening the war.
Nixon also pursued negotiations. Creighton Abrams shifted to smaller operations, aimed at NLF logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. Nixon also began to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. This policy helped to decrease global tensions. Détente led to nuclear arms reduction on the part of both superpowers. But Nixon was disappointed that China and the Soviet Union continued to supply the North Vietnamese with aid. In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine.
The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the United States. Nixon appealed to the "Silent Majority" of Americans to support the war. But revelations of the My Lai Massacre, in which U.S. forces went on a rampage and killed civilians, including women and children, provoked national and international outrage. The civilian cost of the war was again questioned, when the U.S concluded operation Speedy Express with a claimed bodycount of 10,889 NLF (vietcong) guerillas with only 40 U.S losses, Kevin Buckley writing in newsweek estimated that perhaps 5,000 were civilians.
Prince Norodom Sihanouk had proclaimed the neutrality of Cambodia since 1955. "We are neutral," he noted, "in the same way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral."Prince Norodom Sihanouk. "Cambodia Neutral: The Dictates of Necessity." Foreign Affairs. New York, NY. Council on Foreign Relations, 1958, pp 582–583. The PAVN/NLF, however, used Cambodian soil as a base. Sihanouk tolerated their presence, because he wished to avoid being drawn into a wider regional conflict. Under pressure from Washington, however, he changed this policy in 1969. The PAVN/NLF were no longer welcome. President Nixon took the opportunity to launch a massive secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu, against their sanctuaries along the border. This violated a long succession of pronouncements from Washington supporting Cambodian neutrality. Richard Nixon wrote to Prince Sihanouk in April 1969 assuring him that the United States respected "the sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia …"quoted in Nonaligned Foreign Policy.[14] Over 14 months, however, approximately 2,750,000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than the total dropped by the Allies in World War II. The bombing was hidden from the American public. In 1970, Prince Sihanouk was deposed by pro-American general Lon Nol. The country\'s borders were closed, and the U.S. and ARVN launched incursions into Cambodia to attack PAVN/NLF bases and buy time for South Vietnam. The coup against Sihanouk and U.S. bombing destabilized Cambodia and increased support for the Khmer Rouge.
Victims of My Lai Massacre.
The invasion of Cambodia sparked nationwide U.S. protests. Four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University during a protest in Ohio, which provoked public outrage in the United States. The reaction to the incident by the Nixon administration was seen as callous and indifferent, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement.Joe Angio. Nixon a Presidency Revealed. Television Documentary, The History Channel, February 15, 2007.
In 1971 the Pentagon Papers were leaked to the New York Times. The top-secret history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a long series of public deceptions. The Supreme Court ruled that its publication was legal.The Pentagon Papers Case.-4k-
The ARVN launched Operation Lam Son 719, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. The offensive was a clear violation of Laotian neutrality,International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos[15] which neither side respected in any event. Laos had long been the scene of a Secret War. After meeting resistance, ARVN forces retreated in a confused rout. They fled along roads littered with their own dead. When they ran out of fuel, soldiers abandoned their vehicles and attempted to barge their way on to American helicopters sent to evacuate the wounded. Many ARVN soldiers clung to helicopter skids in a desperate attempt to save themselves. U.S. aircraft had to destroy abandoned equipment, including tanks, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Half of the invading ARVN troops were either captured or killed. The operation was a fiasco and represented a clear failure of Vietnamization. As Karnow noted "the blunders were monumental … The (South Vietnamese) government\'s top officers had been tutored by the Americans for ten or fifteen years, many at training schools in the United States, yet they had learned little."Karnow Vietnam: A History pp 644–645.
In 1971 Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers. The U.S. troop count was further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. As peace protests spread across the United States, disillusionment grew in the ranks. Drug use increased, race relations grew tense and the number of soldiers disobeying officers rose. Fragging, or the murder of unpopular officers with fragmentation grenades, increased.
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